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OIL PRODUCTION TAX IN ALASKA:
AN EVOLUTION AWAY FROM A
“TRUE” PRODUCTION TAX
Andrew C. MacMillan*
ABSTRACT
Alaska has long relied on taxing petroleum extraction as a key source of
funding for the State. The oil production tax has changed dramatically since
the first barrels of oil were taken from Alaskan land. Most noticeably, the
production tax has adjusted its progressivity element and has moved from a
gross tax to a net tax. This Note provides a historical reference to Alaska’s oil
production taxation scheme in an effort to address whether it is a “true”
production tax. Asserting that Alaska has departed from a “true” production
tax scheme insofar as it more resembles an income tax, this Note assesses
whether the State should return to a “true” production tax.

INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Alaska state legislature passed Senate Bill 21 (commonly
known as the More Alaska Production Act, or MAPA), which
significantly overhauled the state’s oil taxation scheme. Alaskans
opposed to the bill viewed MAPA as a victory for the oil production
companies, and quickly mobilized to gather enough signatures to put the
repeal of the bill to a public vote.1 Although the repeal effort ultimately
failed,2 it brought the merits of the oil production taxation scheme to the
forefront of the Alaskan civic discourse.
MAPA, however, was not the first major Alaskan oil production tax
overhaul in recent history. The Alaskan legislature previously enacted the
Alaska’s Clear and Equitable Share (2007–2013) (ACES) and the
Petroleum Profits Tax (2006–2007) (PPT), both of which, like MAPA,
Copyright © 2017 by Andrew C. MacMillan.* J.D. Candidate, Duke University
School of Law, 2018; B.S., Economics, Oregon State University, 2015.
1. Richard Mauer, Revenue Forecasts: ‘Facts’ Used in Oil Tax Debate May Not
Be, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.adn.com/economy/
article/revenue-forecasts-facts-used-referendum-debate-may-not-be/2014/08/
05/.
2. Repeal Fails, Tax Reform Upheld, ALASKA J. OF COM. (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.alaskajournal.com/business-and-finance/2014-08-21/repeal-failstax-reform-upheld#.Wbh-wtOGP-Y.
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intended to fix inadequacies in the previous tax scheme. These laws,
however, quickly proved to be inadequate themselves. This Note will
consider the evolution of the Alaskan oil production tax. Specifically, this
Note considers the evolving structure of the production tax—primarily
concerning the progressive rate additions and the move from a gross
production tax to a net production tax. Ultimately, this Note concludes
that Alaska’s oil production tax is no longer a “true” production tax—
instead, it now resembles an income tax.
Recently, Alaska’s state budget crisis has renewed debate on the
merits of the current oil production tax scheme. With no state personal
income tax and no state sales tax, Alaska is one of the least taxed states in
the country.3 This is largely due to the state government’s ability to rely
on taxing oil producers for the extraction of Alaska’s abundant oil
resources.4 Unique to the state, taxes on oil and gas have regularly made
up around 90% of the state government’s non-federal revenues.5 And, not
only have Alaskans paid little tax to the State, but “[o]il money [has been]
so plentiful that residents receive[] annual dividend checks from a state
savings fund that could total more than $8000 for a family of four—
arriving each autumn, as predictable as the first snowfall.”6 In recent
years though, the price of oil has dropped precipitously, leaving the State
in severe need of more revenue.7 Consequently, the State cut general fund
spending by around 40% between 2014 and 2017, from over $7 billion to
approximately $4 billion.8 Because oil has long been the main source of
revenue for the State, many policymakers see reforms to MAPA as a
solution to the budget crisis.9

3. Nathaniel Herz, Alaska House Votes to Levy Income Tax, Sending Bill to a
Hostile Senate, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.adn.com/
politics/alaska-legislature/2017/04/15/alaska-house-votes-to-levy-statewideincome-tax-sending-measure-to-a-hostile-senate/.
4. Id.
5. State Revenue, ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N, http://www.aoga.org/factsand-figures/state-revenue (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (“In the state’s 2013 fiscal
year, oil and gas revenues represented 92% of Alaska’s unrestricted revenue.”).
6. Kirk Johnson, As Oil Money Melts, Alaska Mulls First Income Tax in 35 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/us/as-oilmoney-melts-alaska-mulls-first-income-tax-in-35-years.html?_r=0.
7. Steadily Falling Oil Prices Exacerbate State Budget Deficit, ALASKA J. OF COM.
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.alaskajournal.com/business-and-finance/2015-0826/steadily-falling-oil-prices-exacerbate-state-budget-deficit#.Wbh_bdOGP-Y.
8. Les Gara, Here’s Some Real Math to Ponder in Alaska Budget Debate, ALASKA
DISPATCH NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.adn.com/opinions/2017/02/16/
heres-some-real-math-to-ponder-in-alaska-budget-debate/.
9. See Rachel Waldholz, Budget Deal is Done, But Oil Tax Reform Remains
Elusive, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (June 1, 2016), http://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/
06/01/with-budget-deal-done-oil-tax-reform-remains-elusive/
(discussing lawmakers’ expectation of passing “some new version of the oil tax
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However, before changing the oil tax scheme again, it is worth
exploring how Alaska’s oil production tax evolved into MAPA.
Principally, this Note highlights two tensions that become apparent as the
production tax has evolved. First is the tension between ensuring revenue
for the State while also providing a sufficient amount of profit for the oil
industry to incentivize sustainable investment and production. A second
tension is that between principles associated with a production tax and
principles associated with an income tax.
Part I of this Note divides the history of oil production taxes in
Alaska into five periods and examines the legislative histories behind
each. Part II discusses the different types of production taxes and then
synthesizes the evolution of Alaska’s oil production tax, specifically its
consistency with a “true” production tax. Part III considers whether
Alaska should move back to a “true” production tax. Finally, this Note
concludes that Alaska’s current oil taxation scheme resembles an income
tax more than a “true” production tax.

I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: THE FIVE ERAS
A.

Pre-ELF Era (1955 to 1977)

Oil claims in Alaska date back to the 1890s on the Iniskin Peninsula.10
By 1911, the first wells in the territory began to yield substantial amounts
of oil.11 While petroleum production looked promising, the high costs of
transportation and operation in Alaska hindered production.12 The
federal government helped develop the industry by passing the Mineral
Leasing Act, which resulted in the issuance of around 400 exploration
permits in the territory.13 Nevertheless, none of these permits were

reform bill soon” to solve budget crisis).
10. Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska, ALASKA HUMANITIES FORUM,
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modern-alaska/oil-discovery-anddevelopment-in-alaska (last visited Sept. 28, 2017) (“In 1898 the first Alaska wells
were drilled there, striking small amounts of oil, but also striking seawater. The
oil flows were not enough to support the production of oil.”).
11. Id. (“Alaska’s first productive oil drilling operation was at Katalla, on the
Gulf of Alaska, south of the Copper River delta.”).
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Mineral Leasing Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2012)).
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profitable, given the low oil prices and high production costs at that
time.14 Oil production continued to develop slowly over the next thirty
years.15
Despite slow development in production, increased interest in oil led
the territorial government to explore legislation for both the regulation
and taxation of oil.16 After the 1955 legislative session ended without a
general appropriation bill, the territorial governor called the legislature
back into an extraordinary session.17 Possibly based on Oklahoma’s
production tax, the legislature passed House Bill 7, which taxed oil
production at 1% of the gross value of production—the value of the
resource not factoring in operating costs (labor and capital
expenditures).18
In the 1960s, major oil discoveries in Cook Inlet produced over $200
million worth of oil and gas.19 As a consequence of the production and
conservation tax schemes in place at the time, this production provided
the State with around $2,044,000 in total revenues.20
This original 1% of gross value production tax remained unchanged
until 1967.21 That year, a flood devastated Fairbanks, and the legislature
appropriated relief to the victims and the city.22 So began Alaska’s history
of funding a wide range of state expenditures through oil revenue, as the
legislature added an additional 1% “emergency” production tax to the
already existing “general” tax of 1% of gross value.23 In 1968, the
legislature increased the “general” oil production tax by an additional
2%.24
New oil discoveries toward the end of the 1960s completely changed
the trajectory of oil in Alaska. In addition to the dramatic increase in
production and profitability in Cook Inlet, the Prudhoe Bay oil field was

14. See Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska, supra note 10 (noting that
recent oil findings in Oklahoma and Texas saturated the market and decreased
the price of oil).
15. See id. (detailing the development of oil in Alaska).
16. See Thomas K. Williams, State Taxation, in ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12
(1978) (discussing how 272 oil and gas leases issued by the Bureau of Land
Management led lawmakers to enact legislation “[i]n hopeful anticipation of
commercial discoveries”).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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discovered in 1968.25 Prudhoe Bay currently ranks in the world’s top
twenty largest oil fields and is the largest oil field ever discovered in
North America.26 A 2009 legislative review celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of statehood noted the importance of this time period and
concluded:
The discovery at Prudhoe Bay and subsequent discoveries at
other Alaska oilfields . . . created jobs for thousands of Alaskans
and provided funding for many of Alaska’s programs,
developments, and services. Many consider oil to be not only
one of the most important discoveries in Alaska history, but one
of the most important in the history of the United States.27
Amid the spectacle of this grand discovery, state legislators began to
realize the true magnitude of Alaskan oil and, more importantly, the
potential windfall for Alaska.28 In 1969, House Bill 75 was introduced in
the legislature “as a comprehensive approach to oil . . . taxation.”29 The
bill was a dramatic shift from the initial percentage of gross revenue
regime insofar as it implemented a progressive rate structure based on
average daily production per well.30 The new regime, passed in 1970,
taxed 3% on the first 300 barrels per day, 5% on the next 700 barrels per
day, 6% on the next 1500 barrels per day, and 8% on production over 2500
barrels per day.31 The tax applied to the gross value—the market price
minus transportation costs (marine shipping and Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System tariff), but not operating costs like labor and capital—of
individual wells.32 For example, if the market price of oil were $50 per
25. AOGCC Pool Statistics: Prudhoe Bay Unit, ALASKA OIL & GAS
CONSERVATION COMM’N, http://doa.alaska.gov/ogc/annual/current/18_oil_
pools/prudhoe%20bay%20%20oil/prudhoe%20bay,%20prudhoe%20bay/1_oil_
1.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
26. Id.
27. THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE CELEBRATES FIFTY YEARS OF SHAPING THE LAST
FRONTIER 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE CELEBRATES FIFTY
YEARS], http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/LIO50th.pdf.
28. Williams, supra note 16.
29. Id.
30. See Oil & Gas Production Tax Historical Overview, ALASKA DEP’T OF
REVENUE, http://tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/Historical.aspx
?60650 (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
31. Id.
32. The History of Oil Taxes in Alaska, ALASKA H. RES. STANDING COMM.
MINUTES, 27th Leg. (Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Marks Statement] (statement of Roger
Marks, Economist, Logsdon & Associates, Consultant to Legislative Budget and
Audit Committee at 1:16:27 PM); Roger Marks, History of Alaska’s Oil & Gas
Production (Severance) Tax, HOUSE RES., at 7 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.aoga.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/02/History-of-Alaskas-Oil-Gas-Production-TaxRoger-Marks-2.9.2011.pdf. Marks used and referenced these slides throughout his
presentation.
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barrel while marine shipping cost $3 per barrel and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline tariff cost an additional $6 dollars per barrel, gross value would
be $41 per barrel: market price ($50) less marine shipping ($3) and the
tariff ($6). In this case, the first 300 barrels per day, which would be
taxable at a 3% rate, would yield $1.23 in taxes per barrel. The next 700
barrels, taxed at 5%, would yield $2.05 in taxes per barrel, and the next
1500 barrels, taxed at 6%, would yield $2.46 in taxes per barrel, and so on.
Thus, a company that produced 2000 barrels in a day would be taxed
$4264 for that day’s production.
Over the next seven years, the legislature twice amended the
production tax scheme to (1) “establish[] a minimum oil production tax
based on cents per barrel,” and (2) “revise[] the stair step rate schedule to
lower production levels.”33 Nevertheless, the basic “stair step”
production tax model was not changed until the passage of the next
production tax scheme—the Economic Limit Factor (ELF).34
Two important developments occurred in the years immediately
prior to ELF. The first was the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System (TAPS), which connected the Prudhoe Bay oil field in the north to
the city of Valdez in the southern part of the state.35 After vigorous debate
in both the state and federal governments,36 construction of TAPS began
in 1975, and the 800-mile pipeline was completed just two years later.37
TAPS has been described by the Alaskan legislature as “perhaps the most
significant development in Alaska history. . . . Before the first barrel of oil
passed through the pipeline, Alaska was already reaping the economic
benefits of its construction, due to the influx of people and the number of
jobs created.”38

33. Oil & Gas Production Tax Historical Overview, supra note 30.
34. See DAN DICKINSON, COMMONWEALTH N. BD. OF DIRS., REFORMING
ALASKA’S PRODUCTION TAX: ELF, PPT, ACES, CIRA, AND BEYOND 15 (Nov. 23,
2010),
http://www.aoga.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ReformingAlaskas-Production-Tax-Dan-Dickinson-112319.pdf (explaining how the “stair
step” production tax changed in 1977).
35. Trans-Alaska Pipeline History, AM. OIL & GAS HISTORICAL SOC’Y,
http://aoghs.org/transportation/trans-alaska-pipeline/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
36. See generally Andrew Simon, The Trans Alaska Pipeline: A Struggle for
Balance, http://www.washingtonhistory.org/files/library/history-day-sample
_004.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (chronicling the creation of the pipeline).
37. Trans-Alaska Pipeline History, supra note 35.
38. THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE CELEBRATES FIFTY YEARS, supra note 27, at 5–6.

34.2 NOTE - MACMILLAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

OIL PRODUCTION TAX

11/26/2017 8:01 PM

325

The second major development prior to ELF was voter approval of
the constitutional amendment creating the Alaska Permanent Fund. The
Permanent Fund dedicates 25% of the State’s oil revenue to a fund.39 The
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation then invests that money within the
Permanent Fund,40 from which a portion of the interest earned is
distributed to Alaskans in the form of a dividend.41 As of early 2017, the
Permanent Fund’s principal was over $58 billion and the dividend each
Alaskan received was $2072 and $1022 in years 2015 and 2016,
respectively.42 These two developments in the 1970s—TAPS and the
Permanent Fund—indicated both Alaska’s willingness to invest in oil and
the State’s intention to use oil revenue as a main financer of the state.
B.

ELF (1977 to 1989)

In 1976, the Alaska Department of Revenue conducted a study to
evaluate the existing oil tax structure.43 Specifically, the government
wanted to know whether the existing production tax, which did not
incorporate any operating costs into its formula, resulted in needless
production shutdown.44 In other words, was the simple “off the top”
production tax causing producers to shut down wells when they were
operating near the economic limit—the point where barrels produced
only cover the operating costs of the well?
The study concluded that producers were indeed shutting down
wells because of the production tax.45 The Department of Revenue
therefore suggested factoring the current economic condition of the
producing property into the production tax structure.46 Dan Dickinson,
the Director of Tax for the Alaska Department of Revenue, later reiterated
this sentiment, saying that a tax “should never be a thing that caused a
field to shut (down) . . . the production tax shouldn’t be the thing that
makes (the oil field) not be able to cover its costs.”47
39. Frequently Asked Questions, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP.,
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/fundFAQ.cfm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2017).
40. For details on the investments, see Asset Allocation, ALASKA PERMANENT
FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/home/index.cfm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2017).
41. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 39.
42. Kate McFarland, Amount of 2016 Permanent Fund Dividend to be $1022,
BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK (Sept. 29, 2016), http://basicincome.org/news/
2016/09/alaska-us-amount-2016-permanent-fund-dividend-1022/.
43. Williams, supra note 16.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Melissa Griffiths, The History of Oil Wealth, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Aug. 15, 2014),
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Shortly after the study was released, Governor Jay Hammond
introduced a bill during the 1977 legislative session that proposed
reducing the tax rate to zero as the value of oil approached the economic
limit.48 After an “intense and difficult process of negotiation and debate,”
the Alaska legislature passed a bill that incorporated the principles of the
economic limit of production.49 The previous “stair step” production tax
was repealed and replaced by the Economic Limit Factor (ELF).50 ELF
aimed to avoid taxing the barrels of oil generating the revenue that
covered the producer’s operating costs of the well.51 As originally
proposed, the bill would have considered the price of oil in a month to
determine the number of barrels needed to cover the operating costs for
each well that month.52 The final bill, however, set a specific economic
limit, allowing each well to produce 300 tax-free barrels each day to cover
the operating costs.53
To account for lost revenue from the 300 tax-free barrels, ELF
adjusted the nominal tax rate using a multiplier (hereinafter, “ELF
fraction”) based on production. The taxpayer’s production would cause
the multiplier to fall between zero and one, a number which would
subsequently be multiplied against the nominal tax rate of 12.25% of gross
value.54 Therefore, an ELF fraction of zero (producing 300 barrels or less
per day) would equate to a 0% tax and an ELF fraction nearing one would
be taxed near 12.25%. Ultimately, oil wells with higher productivity
would be taxed closer to the nominal tax rate and wells with lower
productivity would be taxed closer to zero.55 In 1981, the nominal tax rate
of 12.25% increased to 15%, and the legislature instituted the “rounding
rule” which rounded any ELF greater than 0.7 to 1.0 for that field’s first
ten years.56 For example, if before the “rounding rule” a well averaged
1000 barrels a day, the ELF fraction would be 0.7. The ELF fraction would
be applied to 12.25% (12.25% multiplied by 0.7). Thus, each barrel would
be taxed at 8.575% of gross value.

http://juneauempire.com/state/2014-08-15/history-oil-wealth (alterations in
the original).
48. Williams, supra note 16.
49. Id.
50. DICKINSON, supra note 34, at 15.
51. Williams, supra note 16.
52. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:16:27 PM.
53. Id.
54. Marks, supra note 32, at 15.
55. Griffiths, supra note 47.
56. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:26:35 PM.
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However, several problems plagued the ELF production tax scheme.
First, the decision to set the number of tax-free barrels at 300 was
arbitrary.57 As the price of oil increased, fewer barrels were needed to
cover operating costs.58 Furthermore, within the normal price fluctuation
of oil, 300 barrels was at the high end of the number of barrels needed to
cover operating costs.59
Second, as new wells were drilled in an oil field, the average well
productivity for that field decreased, lowering the ELF fraction.60 This
encouraged oil producers to drill more wells to lower their production tax
rate.61
Finally, the average daily field production declined as older oil fields
naturally decreased in production, further lowering the ELF fraction.62
Thus, as well drilling increased and field productivity decreased, ELF
fractions, and consequently revenues to the State, diminished.63
C.

ELF II (1989 to 2006)

Given ELF’s favorable effective tax rates, the oil industry was
strongly opposed to any changes in the law.64 Producers asserted that
they relied on the tax scheme to extend the life of expensive projects in
Prudhoe Bay, which they claimed they would not have pursued but for
the generous tax structure.65 Producers became worried in 1988 when
members of the Alaska House of Representatives considered adding daily
field production as a factor in the ELF formula to account for large oil
fields.66 Department of Revenue Commissioner Hugh Malone reasoned
that, because big fields are generally more profitable than smaller fields,
big fields should not be taxed the same as small fields.67 The proposed
change was expected to generate an additional $150 million in tax revenue
in the first year and $1.2 billion over the following five years.68

57. Id. at 1:31:12 PM.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Repeal of ELF Could Deal Economy a Severe Blow, RES. REVIEW, at 1 (Apr.
1988) [hereinafter Repeal of ELF], http://www.akrdc.org/assets/ResourceReviews/rr.april.88.pdf.
65. See id. (“Overall, ELF has been extremely effective in extending the life of
the Prudhoe Bay field.”).
66. See id. at 7 (“Industry warns that the legislature will deal the state’s
economy a severe blow if it repeals the ELF.”).
67. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:37:01 PM.
68. Repeal of ELF, supra note 64, at 7.
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State Senator Mitch Abood opposed any changes to ELF because “[i]t
is creating jobs, stimulating new economic activity and increasing
recoverable oil reserves.”69 He stressed that changes to the law targeting
large oil fields would penalize the industry for its increased production.70
Bill Wade, the president of ARCO Alaska, estimated that the oil industry
was ready to invest upwards of $25 billion during the next ten years, but
threatened that it might reconsider if the legislature increased oil taxes.71
Ultimately, oil companies argued that tax stability was necessary to
decide when and where to invest in oil exploration and production,
specifically during periods of instability in oil prices.72 “Unless we decide
to sacrifice the oil industry on the altar of state spending,” said Tom
Williams of Standard Alaska Production Company, “our elected officials
will have to cut government back sooner or later, and they should start
doing it now.”73
The favorable tax regime for the oil industry ended with a bang at
the end of the 1980s. Specifically, the bang of a 987-foot oil tanker striking
the Bligh Reef in the Prince William Sound on March 24, 1989.74 The Exxon
Valdez oil spill caused an estimated 11 million gallons75 of crude oil to
spill into the Sound, and is widely considered one of the most destructive
human-caused environmental disasters in history.76 Prior to this disaster,
the legislature had rejected two proposals to incorporate field size into the
ELF equation.77 However, on the last day of the 1989 legislative session,
the state legislature narrowly passed a replacement to ELF.78 Roger
Marks, an economist who has been integral in the development of
Alaska’s oil statutory and regulatory structure, claimed that without the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the new tax structure might never have passed.79

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Alan Taylor, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 25 Years Ago Today, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/03/the-exxonvaldez-oil-spill-25-years-ago-today/100703/.
75. Eleven million gallons of oil is approximately equivalent to 257,000
barrels. See Frequently Asked Questions About the Spill, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR.
COUNCIL, https://web.archive.org/web/20070630224835/www.evostc.state.ak.
us/History/FAQ.cfm (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
76. See id. (“The timing of the spill, the remote and spectacular location, the
thousands of miles of rugged and wild shoreline, and the abundance of wildlife
in the region combined to make it an environmental disaster well beyond the
scope of other spills.”).
77. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:37:01 PM.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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While members of the Alaska Department of Revenue argued that
the change was necessary to protect marginal fields, oil companies argued
that its purpose was merely to increase state revenue.80 Regardless, the
legislature passed ELF II, relying on the assumption that larger fields
were inherently more efficient, and thus should be taxed at a higher rate.81
The resulting formula incorporated the daily field production in addition
to the average well productivity.82 Under this new regime, if a field
produced 50,000 barrels per day, and each well in the field averaged 5000
barrels per day, the field’s ELF fraction would be 0.72. This would be
applied to the tax rate (0.72 multiplied by 15%) and the effective rate
would be 10.8%.
Thus, large fields producing an average of 1.5 million barrels each
day were taxed near 100% of the tax rate, regardless of the average well
productivity. Conversely, small fields producing no more than 5000
barrels a day had an ELF fraction of zero, and thus paid no production
tax. An interesting consequence of the formula was that it allowed a
20,000 barrel per day field, which is large relative to most North Slope
fields, to have little-to-no ELF percentage if wells averaged less than 2000
barrels per day.83 This resulted in only three North Slope oil fields—
Prudhoe, Kuparuk, and Endicott—having ELF percentages sufficiently
high to be taxable.84 The rest of the North Slope fields paid no production
tax under this scheme.85
The oil industry was initially hostile to ELF II. Both British Petroleum
and ARCO quickly announced that they would suspend exploration
projects previously planned in the North Slope.86 The oil industry argued
that ELF II would cost them an additional $2 billion in taxes over the
following ten years.87
At nearly the same time, the Texas legislature passed a law cutting
production taxes in half on further production in existing fields resulting
from enhanced oil recovery techniques.88 The oil industry argued that the
higher production taxes in Alaska precipitated by ELF II would
ultimately be detrimental to oil production in Alaska as producers would
turn elsewhere for exploration and production. “No company in any
industry will make bad investments simply to pay some punitive tax to
80. Griffiths, supra note 47.
81. Id.
82. See Marks, supra note 32, at 18 (providing formula for ELF II).
83. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:40:19 PM.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tax Hike Causes Suspension of Industry Projects, RES. REVIEW, at 3 (July 1989),
http://www.akrdc.org/assets/Resource-Reviews/rr.july.89.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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the state of Alaska,” said James Taylor, President of Nabors Alaska
Drilling. “They will, quite properly, invest somewhere else in a less
punitive area.”89
Eventually, the oil industry conceded to the ELF II taxation scheme,
while managing to exploit several of its flaws. Generally, oil producers
had the incentive to decrease field size and decrease well productivity.90
Overall, oil companies focused on creating multiple smaller marginal
fields instead of large single fields to lower daily field production.91
Consequently, the State saw a large decrease in tax revenues from oil
production in the years following ELF II’s adoption.92 For instance, the
Kuparuk field, one of North America’s largest oil fields, was nearing an
ELF fraction of zero by 2005 because its well productivity was inching
toward 300 barrels per day even though its field production was an
estimated 130,000 per day.93 Unsurprisingly, Kuparuk became a symbol
of everything that was wrong with ELF II.94
D.

PPT (2006 to 2007)

By 2006, with oil tax revenue generation greatly lagging behind oil
production, many Alaskans felt that ELF II was failing to serve its
purpose.95 At the same time, oil and gas companies had begun negotiating
with the State to construct a natural gas pipeline from Alaska to the Lower
48.96 Oil companies were concerned about the future of the production
tax,97 and used these new pipeline negotiations as leverage to pressure the
legislature into addressing the tax issue promptly.98 Shortly after the oil

89. Id. at 6.
90. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:42:16 PM.
91. Brian O’Connor, Pot, Oil Props Debated, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN
(Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.frontiersman.com/news/pot-oil-props-debated/
article_82dbf2c0-25c4-11e4-8583-001a4bcf887a.html.
92. Id.
93. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:53:17 PM.
94. See Cherie Nienhuis & Mark Edwards, Alaska Department of Revenue: A
Primer on State’s New Petroleum Production Tax System, PETROLEUM NEWS (Apr. 22,
2007), http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/777055166.shtml (“Under
the ELF system, half the fields on the North Slope were paying no production tax.
The Kuparuk oil field with its satellites was collectively producing more than
150,000 barrels per day and was, by ELF calculations, reaching its economic limit
and would owe no production tax in the next year. Other key fields such as Alpine
had rapidly declining ELF tax rates.”).
95. See id. (“Many people felt Alaska’s production tax system was no longer
functioning as intended and was allowing oil to be produced with very little or
no production tax.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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companies began pressuring the state government, the oil producers’
negotiations with the administration of Governor Frank Murkowski
resulted in the Petroleum Production Tax (PPT).99
Fundamentally, the PPT switched the production tax from a gross
value tax to a net value tax.100 This meant that the tax accounted for
operating costs (capital and labor expenditures) as well as transportation
costs, whereas the gross value tax only accounted for transportation
costs.101
Most economists agreed that a net value tax was more efficient.102
Under a gross tax scheme, a barrel of “light” oil, which might cost $10 to
produce, is taxed the same as a barrel of “heavy” oil, which might cost
$30 to produce.103 However, a net value tax recognizes these differences
by incorporating cost of production.104 Additionally, a net value tax
system, which allows producers to deduct costs from production taxes,
encourages oil producers to invest in Alaska, whereas a gross tax system
can result in producers investing profits in another jurisdiction where
such deductions are available.105
Overall, the Department of Revenue hoped that the PPT would
encourage investment in oil production in Alaska while also taxing an
appropriate share of that investment when it yielded high profits.106 These
two goals were accomplished by instituting a 22.5% tax rate on the net
value of a barrel of oil—production costs (transportation and operating
costs) subtracted from the market value per barrel.
Additionally, PPT added a progressivity element, which kicked in
when the net value increased above $40 per barrel.107 The progressivity
element took the difference between the net value and $40, multiplied that
difference by 0.25%, and then added that value to 22.5%.108 The
progressivity element stopped increasing when the net value per barrel
reached $140, which is when the tax rate reaches 47.5% per barrel.109 For
example, if the price of crude oil were $60 per barrel and the costs were
$30 per barrel, the net value would be equal to $30 and would be taxed at
99. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:54:25 PM.
100. Nienhuis & Edwards, supra note 94.
101. Id.
102. See Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:57:53 PM (discussing that, in
general, “a net system is a much more efficient” tax system than gross).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Press Release, Bill Corbus, Commissioner, Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, PPT:
What It Is. And Isn’t, http://www.revenue.state.ak.us/Portals/5/Docs/Press
Releases/CORBUS%20PPT%20OP%20ED.pdf.
107. Marks, supra note 32, at 24.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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22.5%, or $6.75 per barrel. However, if the price of crude oil were $80 per
barrel and the costs were $30 per barrel, the net value would be equal to
$50 and would be taxed at 25%, or $12.50 per barrel.
Like ELF and ELF II, PPT suffered from several defects. First, the
Alaska Department of Revenue struggled to transition administratively
from a gross value to a net value tax.110 Specifically, the Department had
difficulty determining which operating costs were deductible as
operating costs may vary from field to field.111 Second, a significant
inflation in the cost of oil production in 2007 led to larger deductions and
lower net values than expected.112 This resulted in a lower average tax
rate than expected (closer to 22.5%) and lower overall production tax
revenues for the State.113
Finally, a major corruption scandal in the late 2000s rocked Alaska
politics.114 The scandal led to the federal indictment of U.S. Senator Ted
Stevens and several others.115 During the investigation, evidence emerged
that some of the state legislators who voted for PPT in 2006 may have
taken bribes from VECO Corporation, an oil pipeline service and
contracting company.116 The scandal caused the public to question the
true motives behind the PPT legislation and whether corporate interests
exercised inappropriate influence in its passage.117
E.

ACES (2007 to 2013)

At the end of 2006, during the gubernatorial election, Governor
Murkowski was defeated in the Republican primary by Sarah Palin, who
campaigned on a platform of rooting out corruption and used the PPT as
evidence of Murkowski’s improperly close relationship to the oil
industry.118 The Palin Administration swiftly proposed a new production
110. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 2:07:48 PM.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (explaining that when PPT was implemented, it was estimated to
increase production taxes by $1.1 billion but only an additional $300 million was
actually received, a difference of $800 million).
114. Id.; see generally Jill Burke, Alaska’s Political Corruption Scandal Reaped
Prison, Vindication and Uncertainty for the Accused, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Feb.
11, 2011), https://www.adn.com/politics/article/alaskas-political-corruptionscandal-reaped-prison-vindication-and-uncertainty-accused/2011/02/11/
(overviewing the Alaskan political scandal).
115. Burke, supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 2:07:48 PM.
118. See Joshua Green The Tragedy of Sarah Palin, THE ATLANTIC (June 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/06/the-tragedy-ofsarah-palin/308492/ (“She assailed the ‘secret gas line deal’ and the
‘multinational oil companies that make mind-boggling profits off resources
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tax to replace the less than two-year-old PPT.119 Alaska’s Clear and
Equitable Share (ACES) thus served two purposes.120 First, it sought to
create distance from the politically toxic PPT law.121 Second, it attempted
to fix perceived issues in the PPT. Specifically, it intended to increase both
government revenue and the progressivity.122 To accomplish the latter,
ACES increased both the base tax rate and the progressivity rate.123 Under
ACES, the base tax rate increased from 22.5% to 25%, and the
progressivity mechanism increased the base tax rate by 0.4% for each net
profit dollar over $30 per barrel.124 However, the 0.4% increase decreased
to 0.1% for each dollar over $92.50 per barrel. Overall though, the
structure of ACES was the same as PPT and only differed in the base tax
rate percentage and the acceleration of the progressivity element.125 In
2008 when oil averaged $100 per barrel, ACES brought in about $2 billion
more than the PPT otherwise would have.126
F.

MAPA (2013 to Present)

While Alaska was receiving more revenue under ACES than PPT,
there continued to be a decline in oil production on the North Slope.127
Some argued for yet another change in the oil production tax, insisting
that a lower tax per barrel would increase production and investment in
Alaska.128 ACES had resulted in Alaska having one of the highest oil
owned by all Alaskans.’”); see also Anne Sutton, Murkowski Leaves Office with “No
Regrets,” THE SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/murkowski-leaves-office-with-no-regrets/.
119. Kristen Nelson, Oil Taxes Revisited, PETROLEUM NEWS (Sept. 9, 2007),
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/200707472.shtml.
120. Griffiths, supra note 47.
121. See id. (describing PPT as “turned toxic by political scandal”).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 2:12:59 PM.
127. Steven B. Porter, More Alaska Production Act – Success or Failure, ALASKAN
ADVOCATE: BLOG (Feb. 8, 2015), https://alaskanadvocate.blogspot.com/2015/02/
more-alaska-production-act-success-or.html; see Alex DeMarban, MAPA or ACES
– What’s it Gonna Be, Alaska?, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014),
https://www.adn.com/economy/article/mapa-or-aces-what-s-it-gonna-bealaska/2014/08/11/ (“[O]il production continued to fall, dropping by 200,000
barrels a day in six years, from 734,000 barrels a day in 2007. The decline is part of
the long-term drop in production that has occurred primarily because the state’s
huge oil fields are aging and much of the oil—17 billion barrels since 1977—has
been removed.”).
128. Alaska’s Oil Revenue Inversion: A Look Back at SB 21 Debate Shows Both Sides
Were Wrong, So Far, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
Alaska’s Oil Revenue Inversion], http://www.newsminer.com/opinion/
editorials/alaska-s-oil-revenue-inversion-a-look-back-at-sb/article_9a3653ae-
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production taxes in the world, disincentivizing producers from investing
in the state.129 Supporters of a tax change argued that increased
production would make up for the drop in per barrel tax revenues.130
Governor Sean Parnell, who had replaced Governor Palin after her
resignation in 2009, was among those supporting a change.131
In January 2013, Senate Bill 21, also known as the More Alaska
Production Act (MAPA), was introduced in the Alaska State Senate.132
MAPA’s goal was to “put in place a system for the taxation of oil and gas
that is fair, stable, predictable, durable, balanced, and free from
complexity across a wide range of oil prices.”133 MAPA retained the net
value element from ACES, meaning that producers could continue to
deduct their operating expenses.134 However, MAPA did not contain a
progressivity element like ACES and PPT had.135 Instead, MAPA
increased the base tax rate to 35%.136 While ACES and PPT allowed the
government to enjoy a large windfall as oil prices increased, MAPA
instead raised the base tax, but allowed producers to benefit from an
increase in oil revenue.137 Proponents hoped this chance for larger profits
would incentivize oil producers to invest in Alaska.138
In addition to changes to the production tax structure, MAPA
significantly altered the tax credits available to producers.139 While tax
credits are beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth recognizing that
MAPA’s tax credits essentially lower the base tax rate by giving
producers up to $8 in credits per barrel depending on the price of oil and
the age of the oil field.140

9d54-11e4-9033-236f05430e55.html.
129. Repeal Fails, Tax Reform Upheld, supra note 2.
130. Alaska’s Oil Revenue Inversion, supra note 128.
131. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, OVERVIEW OF SB 21 OIL & GAS PRODUCTION TAX
2 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session
=28&docid=349.
132. S.B. 21, 2013 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 10.
133. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. 441 (Feb. 28, 2013).
134. See DeMarban, supra note 127 (“ACES’ progressivity, which both sides
agree was too high, has been cited by oil executives as a key reason ACES should
be banished forever. The progressivity . . . remove[s] huge profits from the
producers.”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.

34.2 NOTE - MACMILLAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

11/26/2017 8:01 PM

OIL PRODUCTION TAX

335

MAPA barely passed the Senate on March 20, 2013, by a vote of
eleven to nine.141 In April, the House of Representatives passed the
measure,142 and Governor Parnell signed MAPA into law on June 24,
2013.143
Shortly after MAPA’s passage, organizers formed a campaign to
repeal MAPA through a ballot initiative.144 Critics of MAPA claimed that
the new tax structure gave too much to oil companies while not giving
enough to Alaskans—the true owners of the oil.145 Economist Gregg
Erickson146 made the case for repeal this way:
The reason they should vote for repeal is the benefit to Alaska is
so much smaller, in terms of increased production, than what is
lost to Alaska by cutting tax rates at high prices. If oil prices are
low, MAPA really doesn’t matter much, it’s not that different
from ACES. But if we have another big run-up in oil prices, that’s
when we get the windfall that gives us a cushion of savings that
allows the Alaska economy not to be strangled if prices fall or
production falls.147
Anchorage Chamber of Commerce president, Andrew Halcro, was
one of many against the repeal, arguing that “the previous tax structure
killed investment. It created disincentives for investments and the new
tax regime is working and putting more oil in the pipe.”148 Of course, the
big oil companies vehemently opposed repeal and spent millions of
dollars fighting the initiative.149

141. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. 740 (Mar. 20, 2013).
142. ALASKA HOUSE JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. 1235 (Apr. 13, 2013).
143. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. 1291 (June 6, 2013).
144. DeMarban, supra note 127.
145. See id. (quoting state Senator Bert Stedman as arguing that MAPA did not
fairly compensate “we the resource owner, the collective citizens of this state”; see
also Laurel Andrews, Will Opponents of Oil Tax Cut Bill Bring Referendum to the
Ballot?, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (May 2, 2013), https://www.adn.com/
politics/article/will-opponents-oil-tax-cut-bill-bring-issue-ballot/2013/05/02/
(reporting that a group of organizers, spearheaded by former legislator Ray
Metcalfe and other long-time Alaska politicians, named “Vote Yes! Repeal SB21”
sponsored a ballot referendum to kill the bill proposing the new tax structure).
146. See generally ERICKSON & ASSOCS., http://www.ericksoneconomics.com/
(Sept. 7, 2014) (providing Gregg Erickson’s credentials).
147. DeMarban, supra note 127.
148. Id.
149. Lisa Demer, Oil Companies Are Spending Millions to Stop Repeal of Alaska
Tax Cuts, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Feb. 9, 2014), https://www.adn.com/
uncategorized/article/oil-companies-are-spending-millions-stop-repeal-alaskatax-cuts/2014/02/10/.
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The repeal campaign gathered over 50,000 signatures, more than the
requisite amount to put the question on the ballot.150 A “yes” vote would
reinstate ACES.151 But on August 19, 2014, voters in Alaska narrowly
voted “no” on the repeal, and MAPA survived.152
On the day of the vote, the price of Alaska North Slope West Coast
oil was $100.30 per barrel.153 A year and a half later, in February 2016, the
price had plummeted to $28.05 per barrel.154 This drop in oil prices caused
a severe statewide recession, resulting in significant budget deficits and
unemployment.155 The future of MAPA is once again in question, as
lawmakers search for ways to fund the state.156

II. DOES ALASKA HAVE A “TRUE” PRODUCTION TAX?
A.

A Production Tax

As demonstrated above, Alaska has had an oil production tax, in one
form or another, since the 1950s. To summarize, a production tax is
simply an excise tax that a government charges producers for the
privilege to extract natural resources from its lands.157 The idea of a
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Repeal Fails, Tax Reform Upheld, supra note 2.
153. See Crude Oil and Natural Gas Prices, ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE: TAX DIV.,
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/oil/dailyoil/dailyoil.aspx (last visited
Oct. 3, 2017) (providing a tool to see historical crude oil prices).
154. Id.
155. Alex DeMarban, Recession Grips Alaska as Employment Losses Hit New
Sectors, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.adn.com/businesseconomy/2016/12/02/recession-grips-state-as-employment-losses-in-alaskagrow-hitting-new-sectors/.
156. Nathaniel Herz, New Alaska House Oil Tax Bill Emerges but Faces an Uphill
Climb in Senate, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.adn.com/
politics/alaska-legislature/2017/04/07/new-alaska-house-oil-tax-bill-emergesbut-faces-an-uphill-climb-in-senate/. In 2017, the Alaska Legislature passed HB
111, which primarily made changes to the system of oil production tax credits, but
did not touch the basic tax structure of MAPA discussed in this Note. The bill
could show an eagerness by the legislature to make further, more structural,
changes. It might also show a reluctance by the State to completely overhaul the
tax scheme, instead looking for solutions within the realm of MAPA. See H.B. 111,
30th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Alaska 2017); see also James Brooks, At Deadline, Alaska
Legislature Cuts Oil Subsidies to Help Budget, JUNEAU EMPIRE (July 17, 2017),
http://juneauempire.com/state/2017-07-16/deadline-aslaska-legislature-cutsoil-subsidies-help-budget.
157. Nancy E. Shurtz, State Taxation of Energy Resources: Are Consuming States
Getting Burned?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 55, 58 (1983); see Matthew Berman, Comparing
Alaska’s Oil Production Taxes: Incentives and Assumptions, INST. OF SOC. AND ECON.
RESEARCH: UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE 3 (Aug. 2014), http://www.iser.uaa.
alaska.edu/Publications/webnote/2014_08-WebNote18ComparingAKOilTaxes.
pdf (“As a landowner, the state can accept payments from oil companies for the
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production tax is rooted in a government’s ownership of its undeveloped
natural resources.158 A government’s main job is not mining for resources,
which is enormously expensive.159 Instead, resource production
companies request to exploit the government’s resources.160 In exchange,
those producers pay the government a tax based on a valuation of the
extracted resource.161 This Part discusses three different types of
production taxes: a real production tax, a gross production tax, and a net
production tax.
B.

Real, Gross, or Net?

Real, gross, and net production taxes differ in how they assess the
taxable value of the resource. A real production tax “is not tied to the
value of the product mined.”162 Instead, a real production tax levies a set
fee, based on the number of units extracted by the producer.163
From an administrative perspective, a real production tax is very
easy to oversee. All the government needs to know is the number of units
produced and the current fee levied per unit. However, the real
production tax is inflexible in changing circumstances. Unless the
government changes the tax rate, the real production tax will levy the
same fee no matter the value of the unit or the costs associated with its
production.164
A gross production tax is a direct response to that issue of
inflexibility. Instead of applying a fixed tax per unit, a gross production
tax levies a tax based on the “dollar value of the product extracted from
the mine.”165 While different in their application, both real and gross
production taxes take a set portion of the extracted resource’s worth.166
From the point of view of the government levying the tax, the greatest
advantage of a gross production tax over a real production tax is the
ability for tax revenues to increase with increases in the price of the

rights to exploit resources that the state owns.”).
158. See Berman, supra note 157, at 3.
159. See id. at 3–4
160. Id.
161. Shurtz, supra note 157, at 58–59.
162. THOMAS STINSON, ECON. DEV. DIV., ECON. STATISTICS, AND COOP. SERV., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., STATE TAXATION OF MINERAL DEPOSITS AND PRODUCTION 7 (1978),
https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/naldc/download.xhtml?id=CAT79709477&content
=PDF.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 9 (explaining that a real production tax “fails to adjust
automatically to the effect of inflation on local revenue needs”).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 10.
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resource.167 By the same logic though, the state’s revenues decrease when
the price of the resource decreases.168 Overall, the only major difference
between real and gross production taxes is the mechanism used to
determine the government’s portion of the resource’s value—a set fee as
opposed to the market price of the resource.
The final type of production tax is the net production tax. The net
production tax differs dramatically from both real and gross production
taxes, and actually resembles a net income tax more than it does a real or
gross production tax.169 Instead of taking a portion of the resource’s value,
a net production tax considers the operating costs (capital and labor).170
As a result, a net production tax is much more difficult to administer.171
Additionally, the government will not receive any compensation for
resources extracted from its land when the value of the resource is equal
to the production costs. This is seemingly at odds with the point of a
production tax. However, a net production tax does have the advantage
of taxing more profitable producers at a higher rate per barrel than lowprofit producers.172 This encourages producers to extract resources in
costly regions, which they likely would not do under a real or gross
production tax.
To further illustrate the differences between real, gross, and net
production taxes, imagine a film studio. The studio owns resources, films,
but they are not in the theater business. They need someone to actually
show the films to consumers. The studio is analogous to a government
and its natural resources. Instead of establishing theaters, the film studio
makes a deal with a privately-owned theater, analogous to a resource
production company. The deal allows the theater to use the films if the
theater pays the film studio a fee, analogous to a production tax. If the fee
resembled the real production tax, the film studio may set the fee at $1
million for the right of the theater to show a film, regardless of the ticket
price. If it resembled a gross production tax, the film studio may set the
fee at 10% of each ticket sold. Under the net production tax, however, the
film studio may set the fee at 10% of the profit made by each ticket sold.
Under this model, the film studio is no longer paid based solely on the
film, but now must factor in the theater’s own costs. Thus, the film studio
receives compensation for the resource, but also shares in the costs
associated with the utilization of the resource.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
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Alaska’s Production Tax

At first, Alaska had a very simple gross production tax on its oil
resources.173 This tax was consistent with the ideology of the production
tax: the state should share in some value of its extracted resource.174 Over
time though, the production tax changed, becoming more complicated
and taking on features possibly at odds with that principle.
In the first three tax eras (Pre-ELF, ELF, and ELF II), Alaska taxed the
gross value of each individual barrel of oil.175 This meant that each barrel
of oil was taxed according to its market price minus transportation costs.
This form of taxation is consistent with the gross production tax—a set
percent of the oil’s value goes to the state. From a tax policy point of view,
this might not be the most efficient way for the government to balance
both interests at stake: assuring revenue to the government while also
providing a sufficient amount of profit for the oil industry to incentivize
sustainable investment and production.
In response, in 1970, the Alaska Legislature added rate adjustments
to the gross production tax.176 Instead of taxing each barrel produced at a
set percentage, the production tax effectively increased its rate as the
number of barrels increased by some metric. The first comprehensive oil
production tax in the Pre-ELF era used a metric based purely on the
number of barrels to increase the gross production tax rate.177 The stairstep structure of this era increased the tax rate as the number of barrels
produced per well increased.178 The added progressivity was included
under an economies of scale assumption—that higher output producers
can afford to pay more per unit in tax.179 The subsequent tax schemes
relied on similar assumptions connecting the tax rate with output metrics
that supposedly reflect ability to pay.
Even though both the ELF and ELF II era appeared to have a flat
gross production tax rate, both featured mechanisms that effectively
increased the tax rate based on output.180 Both eras assumed that the
economic limit for wells—the number of barrels needed to cover
operating costs—should not be taxed.181 Therefore, these schemes used
formulas as devices to tax higher producing wells closer to the flat rate
173. Williams, supra note 16.
174. See Berman, supra note 157, at 12.
175. Williams, supra note 16 (discussing the Pre-ELF period).
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Griffiths, supra note 47 (discussing ELF); Marks, supra note 32 (discussing
ELF II).
181. See supra notes 44–81 and accompanying text.
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specified in the statute.182 Under ELF, the tax rate mechanism only
considered the average daily well production, thus increasing the rate as
production increased.183 This is fundamentally like the pre-ELF era,
although more dynamic due to its consideration of operating costs.184
Under ELF II, the mechanism additionally considered the field
productivity.185 This expanded economies of scale beyond the individual
well to the entire field.186
Rate progressivity does not necessarily fit within the “true”
production tax ideology. If it is assumed that a production tax is meant to
“defer the overall social, environmental, and economic costs associated
with producing that natural resource,” then rate progressivity within a
production tax seems to assume the costs borne by a state grow at an
increasing rate.187 Using production tax logic, ELF, for example, assumes
the first 300 barrels per day cause no social, economic, or environmental
harm to the state. This is inconsistent with the “true” production tax,
which is concerned with the state receiving a set portion of the value of
each unit extracted. Ultimately, adding progressivity begins to transform
the production tax into a form of income tax, which concerns itself with
the profits earned from an endeavor, like a net production tax.
In the years to follow, Alaska further differentiated its production
tax from a “true” production tax. In 2006, Alaska switched the production
tax from taxing the gross value of the oil produced to the net value of
production.188 Under PPT, ACES, and MAPA, the production tax factored
in the costs of production. Put simply, instead of taxing the value of the
resource (or the revenue to the firm), the net production tax levied a tax
based on the profit earned from each unit produced—similar to an income
tax. This effectively switched the production tax from a gross production
tax to a net production tax.
It is worth considering how a gross production tax and net
production tax differ in similar circumstances. Under a gross production
tax, a 10% tax would be applied to the market price of oil (minus
transportation costs) regardless of the production costs. For example, if
the market price minus transportation costs was $100, the tax would
amount to $10 per barrel, regardless of whether the production costs were
$10 or $80. Thus, any increase in the spread between revenue and costs
would not affect the production tax. Taxing gross profit, then, is
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shurtz, supra note 157, at 59.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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regressive because at a consistent price of oil, the actual tax paid will stay
the same, even as a producer becomes more efficient and decreases its
costs. As it relates to the profit per barrel, the effective production tax rate
decreases as profit per barrel increases.189
However, with a net production tax, the production costs are
subtracted from the $100 barrel of oil to get the taxable amount. For
example, if production costs were $10, then the taxable amount would be
$90 (taxed at 10% means a tax per barrel of $9) and if production costs
were $80, then the taxable amount would be $20 (taxed at 10% means a
tax per barrel of $2). Even with a flat tax rate, a net production tax is more
progressive than a gross production tax because the tax paid will increase
as profit increases.190
Ultimately, a net progressive tax is not consistent with the
fundamental principle behind a production tax—that a government
should share in some portion of the extracted resource’s value to defer
costs borne by the government. Instead of being concerned with each unit
extracted from its territory, the net production tax levies a tax on the units
extracted based on the costs associated with their production. To keep this
consistent with a “true” production tax, one must assume that an increase
in production costs equates to a decrease in overall social, environmental,
and economic costs associated with the resource extraction. But, increases
in oil production costs do not decrease the social, environmental, and
economic costs borne by the state. The net production tax must be relying
on some other theory.
When Alaska included rate progressivity and moved from a gross
production tax to a net production tax, Alaska effectively did away with
a “true” production tax. Instead, Alaska adopted a tax which considered
only the profit made by a producer instead of the number of units
extracted from its land. In the end, this means that Alaska no longer has
a “true” production tax and MAPA is for all intents and purposes an
income tax labeled as a production tax.

189. See Berman, supra note 157, at 5 (“A constant percentage tax on gross
wellhead production value is a regressive tax, because it does not take costs into
account.”).
190. Id.
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III. SHOULD ALASKA RETURN TO A “TRUE” PRODUCTION TAX?
Functionally, Alaska no longer has a “true” production tax. This
matters when one considers the tension between ensuring revenue for the
state while still allowing the oil companies enough opportunity to profit
so as to incentivize sustainable investment and production. A “true”
production tax is actually not very efficient. As discussed above, both real
and gross production taxes do not consider a producer’s ability to pay the
tax.191 The taxes instead take a fixed portion per unit. This can result in a
deadweight loss for producers taxed beyond their ability to pay—leading
to decreased production. Additionally, this can result in a decrease in
revenue for the state when wealthier producers pay less than what they
are able. On the other hand, a net production tax’s core concern is a
producer’s profit, which coincides with a producer’s ability to pay. A net
production tax, then, better balances the needs of both the state and the
firm than a more “true” production tax.
Furthermore, it is worth reviewing the legislature’s reasons for
moving from a gross production tax to a net production tax. First, the
legislature became concerned with the cost discrepancy between “heavy”
oil and “light” oil.192 If all oil costs the same to produce, taxing them at the
same percent of value makes sense. However, “heaviness” and
geographic considerations make some oil much more expensive to
produce than other oil—leading to issues when they are taxed at the same
amount. Moving to a net production tax recognizes that difference,193
rather than punishing the production of high-cost oil. This gives
producers some incentive to develop higher cost oil that they would not
have produced under a gross production tax.
Discrepancies in production costs aside, the net production tax
incentivizes producer investment in Alaska more than either a real or
gross production tax would.194 This is because, under a net production
tax, producers can deduct their costs.195 This means that producers can
actually reduce their taxes by investing in Alaska: a win-win for the state
and the oil companies.196 However, under a gross production tax,
producers are incentivized to take their profits and invest them in another
area where the government allows cost deductions.197

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
Marks Statement, supra note 32, at 1:59:48 PM.
Id. at 02:00:00 PM.
Id. at 02:00:30 PM.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, even though a net production tax differs functionally from a
“true” production tax, it is actually more efficient for the state. Not only
does a net production tax do a better job of judging a firm’s ability to pay,
resulting in higher production and increased revenues for the state, it also
encourages the production of expensive oil and producer investment in
Alaska. In the end, Alaska will be able to better balance the revenue needs
of the government and the profit interests of the producers by continuing
its net production tax even though it no longer resembles a “true”
production tax.

CONCLUSION
The abundance of oil in Alaska has come with both benefits and
costs. Without oil, Alaska would not have the luxury of the Permanent
Fund, the development of a large oil industry, and relatively low taxes on
individuals. On the other hand, the development of oil has brought
troubles like environmental destruction, political corruption, and a state
economy so dependent on oil that a price drop triggered a statewide
recession. Fundamentally, the oil production tax is designed to offset
some of these costs borne by the state.
The oil production tax in Alaska has changed dramatically since the
first barrels of oil were taken from Alaskan soil. Most noticeably, the
production tax has moved from a gross tax to a net tax more closely
resembling an income tax than a “true” production tax. While no longer
a “true” production tax, the current net value production tax is more
dynamic and a better policy for both the state and the oil producers. Thus,
as the legislature looks to the tax code as a possible way out of the current
budget crisis, any changes to MAPA should avoid altering the
fundamental net value component of the oil production tax.

